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ABC v St George’s Healthcare Trust and Ors: A new duty of 
care? 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In modern medicine it is increasingly common for patients to undertaking genetic testing for 
particular disorders. The results of these tests can have life-altering implications for patients 
and their relatives. A significant ethico-legal dilemma exists here, with regards to balancing 
the potential liability of healthcare professionals (“HCPs”) to disclose such information to 
those who may be affected, and the duty of confidentiality owed to patients. In other words: 
to what extent do HCPs owe a duty of care to their patient’s family to disclose a hereditary 
disease? An important decision bearing on this issue is ABC v St George's Healthcare NHS 
Trust & Ors.1 The judgment does not go so far as to answer the above question,  however it 
provides a degree of clarification on the scope of that duty and the circumstances in which it 
would apply. In a compassionately worded judgment Yip J held in the case of that 3 NHS 
trusts were not negligent in not disclosing to ABC (“the claimant”) that her father (“XX”) had 
been diagnosed with Huntington’s Disease (“HD”). Interestingly, while Yip J held that two of 
the defendants did not owe a duty of care to the claimant, she found that South West London 
and St George’s Mental Health Trust (“the second defendant”) owed the claimant a duty of 
care to ABC, but that this duty had not been breached. The latter development of duty of care 
to a patient’s relative, and the lack of breach found therein, are the subject of discussion in 
this case note.  
 
B. THE FACTS 
The circumstances surrounding this case are, as Mrs Justice Yip commented in her ruling, 
“tragic and unusual.”2 In 2007, the claimant’s father killed her mother, and was found guilty 
of manslaughter by diminished responsibility. Pursuant to a hospital order he was placed in 
the care of the second defendant. Consequently, XX’s family were offered family therapy. 
The reasons for XX’s symptoms were also investigated, and from early in his admission it 
was suspected that he had HD: a neurodegenerative disorder, the clinical features of which 
include psychiatric and cognitive problems, and abnormalities of movement. This disease is 
                                                            
1 ABC v St George's Healthcare NHS Trust & Ors [2020] EWHC 455 (QB) (“ABC”). 
2 Ibid, para 6.  
incurable, and markedly reduces life expectancy. There is a 50% chance that the offspring of 
someone with HD will also inherit the disorder, as it is an autosomal trait.3 In 2009 ABC fell 
pregnant. By the time that XX’s diagnosis was confirmed and made known to XX, her 
pregnancy was beyond the 24-week stage (the limit on abortion, except under exceptional 
circumstances).4 Throughout the investigations, several discussions took place across XX’s 
clinical teams regarding the effects that his diagnosis may have on ABC, including her 
decision on whether to continue her pregnancy. XX maintained throughout that he did not 
want to tell ABC about his diagnosis. In 2010, ABC was informed of her father’s diagnosis 
by his clinician. This was a breach of XX’s confidentiality. 
ABC tested positive for HD in 2013. ABC brought a claim both in negligence5 and 
argued that if she had been informed of her father’s condition, she would have undergone a 
test for HD. As that test would have been positive, she would have terminated her pregnancy. 
She sought damages for the continuation of her pregnancy, psychiatric damage, and 
consequential losses. This case was initially struck out by Nicol J in 2015 on the grounds that 
there was no reasonable cause of action.6 However this ruling was overturned by the Court of 
Appeal.7 Next, it was heard by Yip J in the High Court. 
 
C. THE DECISION 
(i) Overview 
Yip J outlined the legal and factual issues at hand as follows: (i) did any of the defendants 
owe a duty of care to the claimant?; (ii) If so, what was the scope and nature of that duty?; 
(iii) did any duty exist that required ABC be given information be given sufficient 
information to allow her to undergo genetic testing and termination of her pregnancy?; (iv) if 
a duty of care was owed, was that duty breached by failing to give that information?; and (v) 
if there was a breach, was there sufficient causation here, ie did it cause the continuation of 
ABC’s pregnancy when it would have been terminated otherwise?8  
                                                            
3 Ibid, para 9.  
4 See the Abortion Act 1967, section 1(1).  
5 She also brought a claim under the Human Rights Act 1998 for a breach of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Article 8. This was rejected as it did not add to the claim. See 
ABC, paras 254-8. 
6 [2015] EWHC 1394 (QB). 
7 [2017] EWCA Civ 336. 
8 ABC, para 24.  
Yip J was clear from the outset that she would not attempt to define the limits of a duty of 
care owed by doctors to those who are not their patients. Citing Kent v Griffiths,9 she 
emphasised that she was only required to determine whether a duty was owed to ABC, on the 
facts of this case. 10 Three potential routes to a duty of care were identified:  (1) ABC was 
owed a duty by virtue of a doctor-patient relationship between her and the defendants; (2) by 
providing family therapy and treatment to ABC’s father, the second defendant had assumed 
responsibility for ABC’s welfare; (3) otherwise, that this case was a “novel claim” and 
established principles should be applied to the facts of the case by incremental extension.11 
Yip J found that a duty of care could not be found via routes (1) or (2) above, and thus, her 
consideration turned to point (3).  
 
(ii) A Duty of Care 
To expand on route (3) - on which this case turned - in Caparo Lord Oliver applied the view 
of Brennan J in the case of Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman, which was that: “the law 
should develop novel categories of negligence incrementally and by analogy with established 
categories, rather than by a massive extension of a prima facie duty of care…”.12  Yip J 
agreed that this case was a “novel claim” in relation to which a duty of care had not 
previously been recognised by the courts,13 and thus her consideration turned to question of 
whether a relevant duty should be recognised here.  
Yip J noted that the courts have been willing to recognise that a doctor or health 
authority can owe a duty of care to persons other than their primary patient, but only where 
there is a close proximal relationship between them.14 As her deliberation unfolded, she 
indeed found that there was a close proximal relationship15  between ABC and the second 
defendant because of the “factual matrix” of the case.16  
                                                            
9 [2001] QB 36, para 37. 
10 ABC, paras 34-5.  
11 See Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; Robinson v Chief Constable of 
West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4. 
12 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman, 60 A.L.R. 1, paras 43-44. 
13 ABC, para 156.  
14 Ibid, para 170.  
15 See Caparo; Thake v Maurice [1986] QB 644; McFarlane v Tayside [2000] 2 AC 59; 
Goodwill v British Pregnancy Advisory Service [1996] 1 WLR 139. 
16 ABC, para 173.  
Next, citing Montgomery17 Yip J gave some weight to the submission that the recognition of 
such a duty would not be “novel”, but rather a “modest incremental step” as recognising that 
duty was in line with professional guidance.18 Yip J thus concluded that it was “fair, just and 
reasonable”19 to “impose on the second defendant a legal duty to the claimant to balance her 
interest in being informed of her genetic risk against her father's interest in preserving 
confidentiality in relation to his diagnosis and the public interest in maintaining medical 
confidentiality generally”.20 A duty of care was thus established between the second 
defendant and the claimant. The limits of that duty were also made clear, however: 
[T]he law is not imposing a new obligation on doctors or hospital trusts. Rather, the 
legal duty recognises and runs parallel to the professional duty to undertake a proper 
balancing exercise which all the experts in this case agreed already exists. The legal 
duty is likely to arise only in limited factual circumstances where there is close 
proximity between the at-risk person and the medical professionals. Even where such 
a duty does arise, it seems to me that the circumstances in which it will give rise to a 
cause of action will be rare…21 
 
(iii) No Breach  
Once a relevant duty had been established, the next question for Yip J was whether that duty 
had been breached. On this matter, Yip J emphasised that if that balancing exercise has been 
conducted properly, then the defendant’s duty had been discharged.22 Her evaluation of the 
second defendant’s “balancing exercise”23 here included an evaluation of the principle of 
confidentiality, which is not absolute.24 Her judgment on this matter took into account, and 
arguably rested on, the clear lack of consensus among medical experts before her.25 She thus 
concluded that:  
this was a difficult decision which required the exercise of judgment. The relevant 
guidelines for psychiatrists made it clear that confidentiality should not be breached 
unless the doctor was certain that this was in the public interest…. There was room 
                                                            
17 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] AC 1430.  
18 ABC, para 186.  
19 See Caparo. 
20 ABC, para 188.  
21 Ibid, paras 195-6. 
22 Ibid, para 193.  
23 See Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
24 ABC, para 38; W v Egdell [1990] 1 Ch. 359. 
25 See Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232. 
for reasonable disagreement as to how the judgment should be exercised. That is 
demonstrated by the lack of consensus in the medical opinion before me. The 
claimant has not demonstrated that the views of the defendants' experts are illogical. I 
therefore conclude that the decision not to disclose was supported by a responsible 
body of medical opinion and cannot be considered to have amounted to a breach of 
the duty I have identified.26 
Overall, Yip J held that the second defendant owed the claimant a duty of care to balance her 
interest of being informed of her father’s diagnosis, with her father’s interest and the public 
interest in maintaining confidentiality. Interestingly, Yip J made known that this duty applies 
to all HCPs in all settings regarding confidential information which could be disclosed to 
prevent serious harm.27 However, she was clear that this duty was neither freestanding, nor a 
broad duty to all relatives regarding genetic information.28 As the above balancing exercise 
had been carried out properly, however, that duty was held to not have been breached. Yip J 
also held that even if there had been a breach, ABC’s claim would have not succeeded 
because causation could not be established, as “the claimant ha[d] not proved that she would 
have undergone a termination if notified of the risk [of HD] during pregnancy”.29 
 
D. A NOVEL CLAIM, A NOVEL DUTY OF CARE? 
No clear inference can be drawn from this judgment regarding whether doctors have a duty of 
care to disclose genetic disorders to the relatives of their patients. Indeed, this judgment tells 
us little  about whether a duty of confidence should be overridden by concerns of risk to 
others; it is clear that this judgement can only apply to very limited circumstances. This is not 
necessarily a negative outcome, however. Any more may have “eroded dangerously”30 the 
duty of confidentiality. While this decision was not momentous in and of itself, the case was 
underpinned by an incredibly complex ethical and legal discussion that dates back years,31 
and it may have implications for years to come. The considerations in this judgment are 
noteworthy for the dual emphasis on patient confidentiality, and the importance of properly 
assessing potential harm to relatives when withholding genetic information. While the duty of 
                                                            
26 ABC, para 231.  
27 Ibid, paras 188-192.  
28 Ibid, paras 195-6 
29 Ibid, para 253.  
30 D Sokol, “ABC of medical confidentiality” (2020) BMJ 368. 
31 See for example G Laurie, Genetic privacy: a challenge to medico-legal norms (CUP, 
2002). 
care found is very limited in scope, it shows that the individualistic nature of tort in relation 
to confidentiality was undoubtedly strained by familial nature of genetic information in this 
case. 32 Indeed, as Dove commented on the Court of Appeal decision: “it demonstrates an 
appreciation of the nuances of social relations in the family and the practical difficulties 
clinicians face in the ethically fraught area of medical genetics.”33  
From Yip J’s considerations, we can glean that there is indeed a duty for medical 
professionals to conduct a balancing exercise between the patient’s and public’s interest in 
maintaining confidentiality, and the interest of the patient’s genetic relative(s) in being 
informed of a genetic disorder, where certain people outside of the doctor-patient relationship 
are at risk. While this duty clearly does not extend to a direct “duty to warn” relatives, 
however, it may do so if the balancing exercise (having been properly conducted)34 falls in 
favour of the relative. HCP’s discretion to do this is not novel; this decision in fact brings the 
law in line with current professional guidelines.35 The judgment thus provides some legal 
clarity to HCPs, in that in the contexts where a question arises regarding whether to disclose 
confidential information to prevent serious harm, a proper balancing exercise must be 
conducted, the outcome(s) of which should be acted upon. This decision may thus be framed 
as confirming a “duty to consider” which, if anything, may enable HCPs to exercise their 
discretion more confidently without fear of legal action.36 Importantly, this should not put 
any increased pressure on HCPs: Yip J noted “the pressures of day-to-day clinical practice” 
and that courts “will afford considerable latitude to clinicians taking difficult decisions in that 
context”.37 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
                                                            
32 N Hawkins and T Hughes-Davies, “Striking a balance: resolving conflicts between the 
duty of confidentiality and duties to third parties in genetics” (2018) 38 Legal Studies 4 645, 
655. 
33 E S Dove, “ABC v St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust and Others: should there be a right 
to be informed about a family member’s genetic disorder?” (2016) 44 Law Human Genome 
Review 91, 93.  
34 See Bolam and Bolitho. 
35 General Medical Council, Confidentiality: good practice in handling patient information 
(2017). 
36 See ES Dove, V Chico, M Fay, G Laurie, A Lucassen and E Postan, “Familial genetic 
risks: how can we better navigate patient confidentiality and appropriate risk disclosure to 
relatives?” (2019) 45 Journal of Medical Ethics 504 at 507.  
37 ABC, para 196.  
The decision in ABC remains important insofar as it establishes a new duty of care, but its 
scope of application is limited by the unusually close proximity between the second 
defendant and the claimant. Arguably the degree of discretion afforded to HCPs here makes it 
unlikely that a breach will be found in the future. With that said, the applicability of these 
unusual circumstances to future actions in the England, Scotland, or elsewhere remain to be 
seen.  
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